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EU enlargement, International 
migration
The free movement of workers within the European Union does not place a burden 
on labor markets or social services. This is the conclusion of a recent study on the 
development and effects of east-to-west migration in the wake of EU enlargement in 
2004 and 2007. In this light, Germany’s restrictive immigration policy received poor 
marks. Recent measures—such as Germany’s labor migration regulation law, which is 
intended to ease the immigration of highly qualified foreigners—are certainly steps 
in the right direction. However, they still do too little to enable Germany to exploit 
the opportunities offered by immigration.
Migration is an integral part of Europe’s past and present. The EU Eastern enlarge-
ment, which took place in two rounds in 2004 and 2007, has added a new dynamic 
to the debate in Germany and at the European level concerning immigration, labor 
migration, and the shortage of skilled workers. The reasons are clear: the enlargement 
was unprecedented in many respects. The new EU member states had recently made 
the transition from planned economies to market economies. In addition, practically 
all east-to-west migration had been cut off for an extended period—from the end 
of the Second World War until the collapse of the Eastern Bloc.1 Furthermore, the 
differences in income and levels of unemployment between the older EU countries 
and the new member states were enormous. Finally, the scale of the expansion—in 
terms of population—presented a significant challenge to the process of European 
integration. These particular characteristics of the Eastern enlargement indicate that 
it was a unique moment in the EU’s development.
EU enlargement was accompanied by concern and general uncertainty in many 
quarters. Primarily, the following questions were raised:
Do immigrants from the accession countries pose a threat to the welfare  •	
systems of old EU countries?
Is the new east-to-west migration accompanied with a loss of jobs for  •	
native-born workers? 
Will the countries of origin suffer from “brain drain” and demographic  •	
instability?
1  The former Yugoslavia is an exception. A successor state—Slovenia—entered the EU in 2004.Poor Marks for Germany’s Isolationist Policy
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In fact, there is no evidence that migration from the 
accession countries has led to the displacement of 
native-born workers or reduced wages (Box 1); and 
the feared immigration into welfare has failed to 
materialize.2 Although a “brain drain”—the emigra-
tion of qualified workers—has been observed in the 
countries of origin, studies show that the circulation 
of skilled workers within the EU can provide a bet-
ter solution to demographic and economic problems 
and may improve allocation efficiency.
2  It should also be noted that access to social services for EU nationals 
is restricted in the member states—in Germany, for example, to those 
looking for work who are not entitled to insurance. An evaluation of the 
effects of the EU’s eastern expansion on migration policy can be found 
in Kahanec, M., Zimmermann, K. F. (eds.): EU Labor Markets after Post-
Enlargement Migration. Berlin et al. 2009, Springer.
The Educational Level of Immigrants 
has risen across Europe
The EU initially adopted a transitional provision 
that restricted labor mobility from the accession 
countries for up to seven years. Most older EU coun-
tries took advantage of this provision—only Ireland, 
the UK, and Sweden immediately opened up their 
labor markets in 2004 with few or no restrictions. 
Over time, more and more member countries have 
decided to lift restrictions. Yet major hurdles were 
placed for those wishing to enter the labor markets 
in Germany and Austria and—at least until January 
2009—these countries continued their policy of se-
verely restricted mobility.3 
3  In January 2009, a labor migration regulation law came into force in 
Germany. It could mark a new beginning for German migration policy.
Box 1
EU Labor Markets After Post-
Enlargement Migration
Martin Kahanec and Klaus F. Zimmermann (Eds.), 
Springer, Berlin et al. 2009, ISBN: 978-3-642-02241-8
This newly released volume, titled “EU Labor Markets 
after Post-Enlargement Migration,” presents the cur-
rent knowledge of the economic effects of migration 
on European labor markets.
Chapter 1: 
EU Enlargement, European Migration Flows, and their 
Labor Market Effects 
M. Kahanec, A. Zaiceva, K. F. Zimmermann
Chapter 2: 
The Redistributive Impacts of Migration after the EU’s 
Eastern Enlargement 
T. Baas, H. Brücker, A. Hauptmann
Chapter 3: 
Post-Enlargement Migration and Public Perception in 
the European Union 
M. Canoy, A. Horvath, A. Hubèrt, F. Lerais, M. Sochacki
Chapter 4: 
The Effects of EU Enlargement and the Temporary 
Measures on the German Labor Market 
K. Brenke, M. Yuksel, K. F. Zimmermann
Chapter 5: 
The Experience of Spain with the Inflows of New 
Labor Migrants 
S. de la Rica
Chapter 6: 
Labor Market Effects of Migration to Ireland from New 
EU Member States 
A. Barrett
Chapter 7: 
Post-Enlargement Migration and Labor Market Impact 
in Sweden 
C. Gerdes, E. Wadensjö
Chapter 8: 
The Impact of the Expansion of the EU on the British 
Labor Market 
D. G. Blanchflower, H. Lawton
Chapter 9: 
The Impact of the EU Enlargement on the Polish 
Labor Market 
P. Kaczmarczyk, M. Mioduszewska, A. Zylicz
Chapter 10: 
The Post-Enlargement Migration Experience in the 
Baltic Labor Markets 
M. Hazans, K. Philips
Chapter 11: 
The Labor Market Effects of Out-Migration in EU 
Accession Countries: The Case of Albania 
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More Immigrants in the German 
Labor Market despite Mobility 
Restrictions
Germany did not immediately open up its labor 
market to immigrants from the accession countries. 
Nevertheless, the number of immigrants from the 
countries which joined in 2004 has risen consid-
erably.5 The net immigration rate for this group 
was about 2.5 times higher from 2004 to 2006 than 
in the four year period prior to enlargement (see 
Figure). Yet this considerable relative increase did 
not amount to a dramatic rise in absolute numbers—
the annual net immigration of this group stabilized 
in the end at a comparatively low level of around 
50,000 people. Among these immigrants, the largest 
group is Poles; they have dominated net immigration 
to Germany for years.
When considering the flows of migrants into and 
out of Germany, it is clear Germany is not a clas-
sical immigration country. On the contrary, with-
out the increase in immigration from the accession 
countries, Germany would have even experienced 
a negative net migration in recent years. This is pri-
5  On the effects of EU Eastern enlargement on Germany, see also Bren-
ke, K., Yuksel, M., Zimmermann, K. F.: The Effects of EU Enlargement and 
the Temporary Measures of the German Labor Market. In: Kahanec, M., 
Zimmermann, K. F. (eds.): EU Labor Markets after Post-Enlargement Mi-
gration. Berlin et al. 2009, Springer, 111–129.
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1   Including individuals with no or unknown nationality. 
Source: Calculations by DIW Berlin.  DIW Berlin 2009
The number of immigrants from the accession coun-
tries rose between 2003 and 2007: the number of 
foreign residents from countries that joined the 
EU in 2004 grew from 893,000 in 2003 to over 
1.91 million, equivalent to 0.5 percent of the en-
tire population of the old EU. The average inflow 
(net immigration) was 254,000 people a year after 
2004, compared to 62,000 a year between 2000 and 
2003. The proportion of foreign residents coming 
from Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU 
in 2007, rose continually from 2000, reaching 1.86 
million people in 2007.
These immigrants are not evenly distributed among 
the old EU states, however. Whereas immigrants 
from Bulgaria and Romania preferred to settle in 
Spain and Italy, disproportionately high numbers of 
those from countries which joined the EU in 2004 
arrived in Ireland and the UK. There is, however, 
no clear relationship between the level of freedom 
of movement and the level of immigration. This is 
illustrated by Sweden, which had removed barriers 
to immigration in 2004 but hardly experienced any 
immigration from the accession countries. It appears 
that other factors such as geographical, linguistic 
and cultural distances or established immigrant 
networks in the destination country play more im-
portant roles than the economic situation.
Along with a rise in numbers, there has also been 
a change in the composition of immigrants from 
the accession countries. Immigrants who arrived 
after enlargement have a higher labor participation 
rate and also a higher employment rate than those 
who emigrated to the “old” EU before enlargement. 
Although the proportion of high-skilled among im-
migrants fell after the enlargement, there was a si-
multaneous drop in the proportion of low-skilled 
workers. This resulted overall in a slight increase 
in the average educational level of immigrants after 
2004.
Then transitional rules restricting labor mobility 
were introduced in part to combat the perceived 
negative effects of immigration on the labor market 
and welfare system of destination countries. Current 
studies, however, have shown that such fears were 
unfounded. Immigrants do not claim social benefits 
more often than natives, and there is even evidence 
of a reduction in income disparities in the old EU 
countries through the arrival of qualified workers 
from the new member states.4 Furthermore, there is 
no indication of a crowding out of native employ-
ment by immigrants, nor a drop in wages.
4  Zimmermann, K. F., Kahanec, M.: International Migration, Ethnicity 
and Economic Inequality. In: Salverda, W., Nolan, B., Smeeding, T. M. 
(eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality. Oxford 2009.Poor Marks for Germany’s Isolationist Policy
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marily due to the emigration of people with German 
citizenship.6
Furthermore, it appears that the composition of im-
migrants has changed following the EU Eastern 
enlargement. Immigrants who arrived in Germany 
after 2004 from countries which joined in that year 
are older and have a lower level of education com-
pared to earlier immigrants. Before 2004, immi-
grants were primarily women. Now, young men 
make up the majority, particularly from Poland and 
the Balkans.
This change in composition is also reflected in the 
success of immigrants in the labor market, which 
was analyzed with data from the 2006 microcensus, 
provided with the kind support of the statistical of-
fices of both the German federal government and 
the Länder (see Table).7 The analysis shows that 
immigrant employment prospects after enlargement 
are 23.1 percent lower among immigrants from the 
new EU member countries than native Germans; the 
difference is only 12.7 percent for earlier immigrants 
from these countries. It appears that this group’s 
labor market attachment has decreased over time, 
as they also have the lowest labor participation of 
all the immigrants, with the exception of non-EU 
immigrants who came to Germany after 2004. At the 
same time, they are predominantly employed in low-
paid jobs, work longer hours and have the lowest 
average net income of all immigrant groups—again 
with the exception of those recently from non-EU 
countries. However, the recent immigrants from the 
accession countries are 15.7 percent more likely 
to be self-employed than natives. In addition, this 
group earns a relatively low income, whether em-
ployed or self-employed. Taking into account the 
high numbers of those leaving and entering, it can 
be assumed that a significant portion of these peo-
ple work on a seasonal basis in low-paid jobs—for 
example, in agriculture. The results suggest that 
these immigrants are more likely to be competing 
with non-EU immigrants for low-skilled jobs rather 
than with native labor force. This group cannot in 
any way meet Germany’s need for a high-skilled 
workers.
In general, restrictions on labor mobility in Germany 
have not resulted in lower net immigration from the 
new member countries—on the contrary, there has 
been a noticeable increase. However, this immi-
grant group’s labor market attachment has decreased 
over time. These findings underline the importance 
of a more open German migration policy aimed 
6  Total net migration in the figure is the sum of all the individual net 
migrations illustrated.
7  The figures in the table are estimated regression coefficients which 
show deviation from the reference group of native Germans.
at attracting high-skilled workers. The restrictive 
policy in Germany neither ensures the inflow of 
urgently required high-skilled workers, nor pre-
vents the undesirable influx of low-skilled. Hence, 
it cannot have any positive impact on the German 
labor market.
Current German and European 
Initiatives Fall Short
The German government notified the European 
Commission in April 2009 that it would continue 
to take advantage of the transitional rules to re-
strict the mobility of immigrant workers from the 
new EU member states. Five years after the EU 
Eastern enlargement, Germany still limits access 
for these workers. The immigration trends since 
2004 discussed above may be exacerbated by this 
policy, for all EU countries aside from Germany 
and Austria have long since fully joined the com-
mon European labor market.8 The German economy 
does not enjoy the benefits of employing skilled 
workers from Eastern Europe, nor should it be as-
sumed that qualified immigrants will have a par-
ticular interest in immigrating to Germany in 2011, 
when Germany has to end restrictions. Against this 
backdrop, renewed mobility restrictions threaten to 
backfire economically.
Still, some positive signals have also come out of 
Berlin. In January 2009, the labor migration regu-
lation law came into effect. The essence of this is 
the appropriate legislation designed to increase 
8  This does not apply, however, to workers from countries that joined 
the EU in 2007. These workers still face mobility restrictions in some 
countries.
Table
Immigrant Success in Labor Markets Compared  
to Native Germans
Income (log) Working hours Employed Self-employed
EU accession countries in 
2004 
(Immigration after 2004) 
–0.277 –0.745 –0.231 0.157
EU accession countries in 
2004  
(Immigration before 2004) 
–0.210 –1.199 –0.127 –0.009
Non-EU countries¹ 
(Immigration before 2004)
–0.126 –0.741 –0.125 –0.021
Non-EU countries¹ 
Immigration after 2004)
–0.371 –2.595 –0.442 –0.037
Old EU member states 
(Immigration before 2004)
–0.031 0.794 –0.023 0.025
Old EU member states 
(Immigration after 2004)
0.058 –1.627 –0.220 –0.010
Germany (naturalized) –0.099 –0.630 –0.061 –0.021
1 Including the EU accession countries in 2007.
Source: Calculations by DIW Berlin. DIW Berlin 2009Poor Marks for Germany’s Isolationist Policy
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Germany’s appeal as an immigration country. The 
law outlines the requirements for work permits for 
immigrants from the accession countries without 
red tape (Box 2). As a consequence, the German 
labor market is completely open to university gradu-
ates from these countries.9 However, it remains to 
be seen what impact the law can actually have. 
Germany continues to send out strong signals that 
it has closed its doors to immigrants, and so a more 
profound effect seems questionable at the present 
time. In fact, this law adds to the general picture of 
a contradictory German immigration policy lacking 
transparency. To effectively communicate a real 
shift in German immigration policy, the government 
must send out much clearer signals.
Steps have recently been taken at the European level 
to make the EU more attractive to immigrants from 
non-member countries. At the end of May 2009, 
the EU Council of Ministers adopted minimum 
standards for admitting skilled workers from non-
member countries (see Box 3). EU countries have 
until 2011 to implement the Blue Card directive 
in their national legislation. At first glance, this 
measure appears suited to persuading high-skilled 
workers considering immigration to focus more on 
the EU. However, the individual EU member states 
have been granted a comparatively large leeway 
in how they implement the directive and establish 
9  This applies to university graduates from non-EU countries as well, and 
hence worldwide, even though here there are additional administrative 
checks, whose effect in practice cannot yet be evaluated. To an extent, 
the regulation represents an attempt to open fully the German labor 
market to university graduates.
their own standards. For example, Blue Card holders 
who want to relocate to another EU country have 
to repeat the application procedure. The maximum 
term of four years is also restrictive. Such regula-
tions clearly prevent the EU from achieving its goal 
of establishing the Blue Card as an equivalent to the 
US Green Card.
Consequences of the Economic Crisis
The current economic crisis added a strong external 
influence to the “natural experiment” of a politically 
determined EU enlargement and the opening up of 
most national labor markets. As a result, a conclu-
sive analysis of the impact on migration flows is in 
effect no longer possible. The focus of the analysis 
must turn to a different research question: trends and 
effects of migration with free mobility but during 
economic downturn.10
Even prior to such analyses, several fundamental 
observations can be made. Labor migration reacts 
strongly to economic cycles—especially when there 
are no restrictions on mobility for those entering for 
the first time, returning to their country of origin, 
or renewed entry to the destination country. In a 
few years, this will be the case in the entire area 
of the enlarged EU. The proportion of temporary 
10  An in-depth analysis of this issue can be found in Kahanec, M., Zaice-
va, A., Zimmermann, K. F.: EU Enlargement, European Migration Flows, 
and their Labor Market Effects. In: Kahanec, M., Zimmermann, K. F. (eds.): 
EU Labor Markets after Post-Enlargement Migration. Berlin et al. 2009, 
Springer, 3–45.
Box 2
The German Government’s Action 
Program
On January 1, 2009, immigration policy measures 
were implemented in an action program called “The 
contribution of labor migration to securing qualified 
workers required in Germany.” Together with changes 
affecting graduates from German schools abroad and 
foreign students educated in Germany, the program 
contains three central elements to ease immigration 
of university graduates and high-skilled workers (the 
“Labor Migration Regulation Law”):
1. The German labor market is completely open to uni-
versity graduates from the new EU member states and 
their family members. It is no longer necessary to first 
determine whether a native is available to fill the posi-
tion in question (priority check).
2. The minimum income threshold for high-skilled work-
ers has been lowered from double the income ceiling for 
assessing contributions to the statutory health insurance 
fund (currently 86,400 euros) to the income ceiling (in 
the West) for assessing contributions to the pension 
fund, which is currently 63,600 euros. They also then 
receive permanent right of residence.
3. The labor market is completely open to university 
graduates from non-EU countries. A priority check is still 
carried out, as well as a check to ensure foreign workers 
are not hired at less favorable terms than comparable 
German workers. 
Source: BMASPoor Marks for Germany’s Isolationist Policy
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immigrants among migrants from EU countries is 
already exceptionally high; and given the changed 
economic environment, it might even increase. In 
addition, the public’s perception and acceptance 
of immigration might be altered under the pres-
sure of economic crisis. This could create a greater 
incentive for immigrants to return to their native 
country, as could a rise in unemployment among 
immigrants—especially if they have only been able 
to find work below their level of qualification, and 
more attractive jobs are available in their country 
of origin.
However, this is where the consequences of a world-
wide economic crisis may show themselves. In con-
trast to the economic slump which began in 2001, 
the effects of the current downturn are felt to the 
same degree everywhere and not asymmetrically 
across economic areas. Immigrants straight out of 
Eastern Europe in particular are confronted with 
poorer economic conditions both in their current 
country of residence and in their country of origin. 
If the situation for them in the older EU countries is 
better, either objectively or even subjectively, it will 
greatly dampen their inclination to return to the new 
EU member states and could even increase interest 
in immigration there. In general, questions of further 
migration and circular migration will play a greater 
role for internationalized labor markets.
The behavior of immigrants from the accession 
countries could also vary depending on their coun-
try of residence and qualifications. For example, 
the current economic crisis in Germany particu-
larly affects export-oriented capital goods industries 
with their high proportion of qualified employment, 
while Ireland and the UK are suffering more from 
the general effects of the global economic downturn, 
which has affected all occupational groups. High-
skilled immigrants (who are often young, single, 
and lacking strong family ties in their country of 
residence) are more likely to return home or migrate 
to another country than low-skilled workers who 
cannot be certain of finding work in their native 
country or elsewhere. Moreover, factors such as 
established networks or language may further serve 
as push or pull factors for European east-to-west 
migration. More accurate forecasts of migration 
behavior are presently almost impossible.
Conclusion
EU Eastern enlargement functioned as an institu-
tional impetus for the migration potential in Europe. 
While the overall number of immigrants from the 
new member states markedly increased between 
2003 and 2007, this increase was distributed un-
evenly among the destination countries of the old 
EU. However, there is no evidence of mass mi-
gration, as was feared in some quarters before EU 
enlargement:11 the proportion of migrants who 
11  See for example Sinn, H.-W., Flaig, G., Werding, M., Munz, S., Düll, 
N., Hofmann, H.: EU-Erweiterung und Arbeitskräftemigration: Wege zu 
einer schrittweisen Annäherung der Arbeitsmärkte. ifo Beiträge zur Wirt-
schaftsforschung. Munich 2001.
Box 3
The New EU “Blue Card” Directive
At the end of 2007, the president of the European 
Commission presented a proposal for an EU “Blue Card,” 
and at the end of May 2009, the EU Council of Ministers in 
Brussels passed a directive including minimum standards 
for admitting skilled workers from non-EU countries into 
the EU. The individual member states must implement 
this directive in their national legislation by 2011.
The directive establishes EU-wide minimum standards 
for the approval procedures of non-EU skilled and highly 
qualified workers. In particular, the following criteria 
have been determined for issuing the “Blue Card,” which 
is valid from one to four years and may be renewed:
Proof of professional qualifications (for example, a  • 
relevant university degree) or at least five years’ rel-
evant professional experience in the sector where 
employment is sought.
Valid employment contract or binding job offer for  • 
a skilled job lasting at least a year and with a gross 
income of at least 1.5 times the average annual salary 
in the destination country (this may be reduced to 
1.2 times the average salary in sectors with an acute 
shortage of skilled workers).
Valid travel documents, proof of health insurance,  • 
background checks.
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moved from the new member countries to the old EU has remained smaller than 
that of immigrants from non-EU countries. Transitional rules repeatedly used to 
restrict labor mobility have clearly “diverted” many qualified immigrants from 
countries that joined in 2004 to Ireland and the UK; whereas Spain and Italy are 
the primary destination countries for Bulgarian and Romanian migrants.
There is no evidence that immigrants from the accession countries have displaced 
native-born workers, depressed their wages, or received welfare benefits to a greater 
extent than the native population. Yet the emigration of the young and qualified 
poses a demographic and economic challenge for their countries of origin. The 
“circulation of knowledge,” an anticipated result of circular immigration and reverse 
immigration, may help to overcome these problems.
Germany has quite intentionally avoided establishing itself as a migration country 
in the enlargement process. Although the number of Eastern European immigrants 
have increased, their qualification level has not improved. Hence, the German 
economy neither enjoys the advantages of employing high-skilled workers from 
Eastern European, nor should it be assumed that qualified immigrants will have a 
particular interest in coming to Germany in 2011, when intra-EU mobility restrictions 
are finally removed. It is currently of little use that the government has meanwhile 
rather discretely implemented regulations for providing work permits for highly 
qualified immigrants from the accession countries without red tape, since the signal 
that Germany’s doors are closed to immigrants is still too strongly broadcast. Such 
a policy is shortsighted even in the current economic crisis, as the future will bring 
a demand for high-skilled workers, which can only be met through immigration.
(First published as “Schlechte Noten für deutsche Abschottungspolitik”, in: 
Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin Nr. 26/2009.)